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IS AN IM]MEDIATE LIQUOR PROGRAM FOR KENTUCKY
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL

POSSIBILITIES ?
FonRtST REVERE BIAcKm*

There is a general opinion to the effect that nothing constructive can be done in Kentucky with regard to the liquor
traffic until the prohibition amendment is removed from the Kentucky Constitution.
Section 226a of the Kentucky Constitution provides:
"After June 30, 1920, the manufacture, sale or transportation of

spirituous, vinous, malt or other intoxicating liquors, except for sacramental, medical, scientific or mechanical purposes, in the Commonwealth of Kentucky is hereby prohibited. All sections or parts thereof of the constitution, insofar as they may be inconsistent with this
section, are hereby repealed and nullified. The general assembly shall
enforce this section by appropriate legislation."

Section 256 of the Kentucky Constitution provides for the
mode of amending the constitution:
"Amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either
house of the general assembly at a regular session, and if such amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by three-fifths of all the members elected to each house, such proposed amendment or amendments,
with tile yeas and nays of the members of each house taken thereon,
shall be entered in full in their respective journals. Then such proposed amendment or amendments shall be submitted to the voters of
the state for their ratification or rejection at the next general election
for members of the house of representatives . . . If it shall appear
that a majority of the votes cast for and against an amendment at
said election was for the amendment, then the same shall become a
part of the Constitution of this Commonwealth . . . "

Section 36 of the Kentucky Constitution provides for the
time of meeting of the regular session of the legislature, to-wit:
"The first Tuesday after the first Monday in January in the even
numbered years."

Section 31 of the Kentucky Constitution provides for the
time of the general election of members of the general assembly,
to-wit:
'Professor of Law, University of Kentucky,
Prohib:tii'n Cases" with a Foreword by Clarence
Wisconsin; I. A., Columbia; LL. B., Ohio State;
ing- Graduate School of Government. Member
Liquor Control Committee.

K. L.-3

author of "Ill Starred
Darrow (1931); A. B.,
Ph. D., Robert Brookof Governor Laffoon's
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"November in the odd numbered years for a two-year term."

From the above sections of the Kentucky Constitution, it is
clear that the State prohibition amendment cannot be submitted
to the people for repeal prior to the November election, 1935.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the query: what can
be done in the interim? The people of Kentucky, by an overwhelming majority, have voted to repeal the eighteenth amendment. Must the state government have its hands tied for two
years before it can further carry out the popular mandate ? Confronted with this apparent obstacle, many of our people have
been fascinated by, and have declared their allegiance to, the idea
of nullification as the way out of the prohibition muddle in Kentucky. But to merely repeal the Rash-Gullion Act would leave
an unregulated and a non-revenue producing liquor traffic, and
that would be unthinkable as a solution of the liquor problem
in Kentucky. The nullificationists have toyed with the idea as
a slogan, but have failed to realize the potential perils implicit
in a negative policy. They have not thought the problem
through.
It shall be our purpose to show the potentialities of nullification as a process of government in Kentucky during the interim
until the prohibition amendment can be removed from the Kentucky Constitution. Before nullification can be advocated as an
effective process of government for solving the prohibition problem, it is incumbent on the adherents to show (1) that it is possible to raise revenue from the liquor traffic, and (2) that it is
possible to regulate the traffic without having either the revenue or the regulatory laws declared unconstitutional as in violation of Section 226a, which is still in the Kentucky Constitution,
and cannot be repealed for two years.
(1) Can the State of Kentucky constitutionally tax the
liquor traffic without authorizing what Section 226a of the Kentucky Constitution condemns?
Three contentions have been advanced against such a proceeding: (1) that by taxing the business the government recognizes its lawful character and sanctions its existence, (2) that
taxation and protection are reciprocal, and (3) that for the government to participate in the profits of an illegal business would
constitute the acceptance of tainted money. Insofar as a state

Ax

IMUEDITE LIQUOR PROGRA

FOR KENTUCKY

193

government is concerned, every one of these contentions was repudiated in a well-reasoned case decided by the Supreme Court
of Michigan in 1875. One of the greatest jurists that this country has produced, Thomas M. Cooley, spoke for a unanimous
court in the case of Youngblood v. Sextion.1
As to the first contention, Judge Cooley replied that taxes
are not favors; they are burdens. They are necessary, it is true,
to the existence of the government; but they are not the less
burdens, and are only submitted to because of necessity. It
would be a remarkable proposition, under such circumstances,
that a thing is sanctioned and countenanced by the government,
when this burden, which may prove disastrous is imposed upon
it, while on the other hand, it is frowned upon and condemned
when the burden is withheld. It is safe to predict that if such
were the legal doctrine, any citizen would prefer to be visited
with the untaxed frowns of government rather than with those
testimonials of approval which are represented by the demands
of the tax gatherer. It is the usual practice for states to exempt
educational and charitable institutions from taxes. If the argument advanced is valid, we do not see why the state should not
have evidenced its approbation of educational and charitable
institutions by taking special care that they should feel its burdens, while at the same time it stigmatized other things which
Wvere regarded as immoral and pernicious, by refusing to permit them to appear on the tax list. A tax roll would thus become an honor roll. Further, the taxation of a thing may be
and often is, when police purposes are had in view, a means of
expressing disapproval instead of approbation of what is taxed.
The second contention contains a transparent fallacy. If the
tax upon any particular thing was the consideration for the
protection given to the owner in respect to it, the contention
might have some validity. But the maxim of reciprocity in
taxation has no such meaning. No government ever undertakes
to tax all that it protects. If a government were to levy only
poll taxes, it would not be on the idea that it was to protect
only the persons of its citizens, leaving their property to rapine
and plunder. On the other hand, if a state taxed only real
property, it would be a fanciful suggestion that real property
was entitled to special protection in consequence. As to the
132
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third contention, if this is tainted money, the state, to be consistent, ought to decline to receive fines for criminal offenses with
the same emphasis that it would refuse to collect a tax from an
obnoxious business.
As early as 1811, a Georgia court construing a state statute,
that imposed a tax of $1,000 on a faro table used for the purpose
of gambling in every different county in which it was so used,
held that the use of the faro table for the purpose of gambling
is not rendered lawful by the tax imposed on the instrument. 2
So a tax statute is not unconstitutional because it imposes a
privilege tax upon a business made unlawful by another statute. 8
So it has been held that the fact that a business was prohibited,
and license could not be obtained authorizing it, was no defense
to an action to collect the tax imposed from one engaged in such
business. 4 It is well settled that a tax may be imposed for purposes of revenue or under the police power for purposes of regulation or prohibition. If it is used for purposes of prohibition,
it constitutes a penalty for carrying on the prohibited business.5
Liquor license fees, in the days before the Volstead Act, were almost unanimously held to be not a tax, but an exercise of the
police power because regulation was the predominant purpose
of the fees. 6
The federal cases are in accord with these state cases. In
the case of United States v. Yuginovitch,7 Mr. Justice Day,
speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court of the United States,
lays down the proposition that "Congress, under the taxing
power, may tax any intoxicating liquors, notwithstanding their
production is prohibited; and the fact that it does so for a moral
end as well as to raise revenue, is not a constitutional objection."
In United States v. Sullivan, Mr. Justice Holmes, again speaking for a unanimous court, holds "that gains from illegal traffic
in liquor are subject to the income tax." Further, under the
doctrine of the License Tax Cases, 9 the Supreme Court of the
State v. Doon and Dimon, R. L. Charlt. 1 (Ga.) 1811.
3State ex rel. Melton v. Rombach, 73 So. 731 (Miss.)
4Foster v. Speed, 111 S. W. 925 (Tenn.); Brunswick-Balke.
r State ex rel. English v. Fanning, 96 Neb. 123, 147 N. W. 215.
6Henry v. State, 26 Ark. 523; Burch v. Savannah. 42 Ga. 596.
7 256 U. S. 450.
8 274 U. S. 256.
9Wall 462. See also Pervearv. Commonwealth of Mass., 5 Wall. 475.
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United States said that the imposition of the license tax on intoxicants did not "convey to the licensee any authority to carry
on the licensed business within the state." The licenses give no
authority, but are merely receipts for taxes. From the foregoing authorities, it should be clear that Kentucky can impose a
license tax upon a business that is prohibited and the law will
not authorize what Section 226a of the Kentucky Constitution
condemns. There is thus ample authority to avoid the intolerable situation of a non-revenue producing liquor traffic under a
policy of nullification.
(2) Can the State of Kentucky constitutionally regulate
the liquor traffic without authorizing what Section 226a of the
Kentucky Constitution condemns? It has been contended that
"any conceivable state regulation, short of prohibition itself,
would be a violation of the prohibition adaitantly prescribed by
.
The states could not merely
.
the state constitution.
regulate, for that would be to legalize what is unqualifiedly prohibited. '"10 If this opinion is correct, nullification as a process
of government is a travesty.
It is our contention that by a system of NEGATIVE REGULATIONS the state can penalize what it wants to penalize, and
in this manner it can control the time, place, and occasion of the
sale, the quantity and quality of liquor sold, and the persons to
whom liquor may be sold. Suppose the Rash-Gullion Act is repealed and a state statute is passed, providing that liquor shall
not be sold to minors and containing a penalty therefor. That
statute does not, by implication, authorize a sale of liquor to
adults. Or suppose an anti-Sunday selling law is passed, containing penalties. That law does not, by implication, sanction a
sale on week days. This proposal has been sabmitted to two of
the outstanding scholars in the field of constitutional law, Professors Felix Frankfurter and Thomas Reed Powell, of the Harvard Law School, and both declare that the scheme is within the
scope of constitutional possibilities.
We desire at this point to introduce the arguments in favor
of the proposal (1) By way of introduction it is necessary
Proto distinguish between "regulation" and "prohibition."
fessor Freund in his work on "The Police Power"" says, "By
" MeBain, "Prohibition Legal and Illegal" pp. 38-39.
11P. 62.
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prohibition is understood that legislative policy which renders
illegal some entire sphere of business or action, and not merely
some particular mode or form of it, or merely its exercise at a
particular time or in a particular place, so that it would still be
possible to engage in the same pursuit by an accommodation to
legal .requirements. With reference to any particular subject
matter therefore, partial prohibition constitutes regulation." As
an example, to prot~bit the use of grain for distillation into
Equor is upon this principle mere regulation as far as the owner
of the grain is concerned. 12 Let it be understood that the plan
we are advocating can only be characterized as "regulation"
under the above distinction. So much by way of introduction.
(2) The states, under the police power, may select and
choose the evils that they want to punish. The sanction of a law
passed in the exercise of the police power is usually a penalty,
and the violation of the law constitutes technically a misdemeanor or a crime.' 3 A state may classify with reference to
an evil to be prevented. A lack of abstract symmetry does not
matter. The question is a practical one, dependent upon experience.' 4 Mr. Justice Holmes has said, "The state may direct its
law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without
covering the whole field of possible abuses."1 5 The presumption
is that the legislature acted with knowledge of the facts and conditions. 16 It has been held that the states need not denounce
every act committed within their boundaries which is included
within the inhibition of the Volstead Act, nor provide the same
7
penalties therefor.
An illustration will aid in making clear the proposition we
are defending. The state of Montana repealed its state prohibition law.' s But in another section of the Code there is still on
the statute books a law providing for a penalty for the sale of
liquor to minors.Y9 Does anyone doubt that a violator of that
law does not commit an offense against the state for which he can
1Ingram v. State, 39 Ala. 247, 84 Am. Dec. 782.
" Freund's Police Power, p. 21.
"Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, vol. 2, p. 813 (8th ed.)
"Patsone v. Pa., 232 U. S. 138.
"Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, vol. 1, p. 372, note 1 for list
of cases (8th ed.)
11Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 236 Mass. 281, 128 N. E. 273.
ISee. 11048.3 Revised Code of Montana, Supp. 1923-27 p. 1072.
"Sec. 11048.1 Ibid.
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be punished? Does anyone contend that such a law sanctions
or authorizes the sale of liquor to adults? That law constitutes
a typical illustration of what we designate as a NEGATIVE
regulation under a system of state nullification. If that law is
valid, is it not within the constitutional competency of a state
under the police power to make selling of liquor on Sunday an
offense? And if that can be done, why is it not possible to provide for a general regulation of the time, place and manner of
sale, the quality and quantity of liquor sold, and the place of
consumption? The state can attack the evil piece-meal. It can
prohibit what it wants to prohibit and provide punishment for
that. Each separate section constitutes a prohibition, but viewing the problem as a whole, the policy could be characterized as
negative regulation. It would not require extraordinary adroitness in drafting such legislation to keep free from drifting into
the position in which the state would be positively legalizing that
which the state constitution condemns. Professor Freund, the
great authority on the police power, has said, "The police power
has dealt with and deals with evils as public sentiment requires,
and that other evils of a different kind affecting different interests and having different consequences are not drawn within the
range of legislation or that they are regulated or restrained in a
different manner and treated with greater severity or leniency,
is not deemed sufficient to invalidate a measure otherwise legitimate, confining itself to some particulardanger." 20 The effect
of such a policy will mean that where public sentiment in a state
allows it, all persons who are not within the proscribed classes
will be enabled to procure palatable liquor under the circumstances and conditions permitted by the state law.
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that nullification, as
ordinarily understood, is simply a slogan, a method of attack, a
strategic maneuver. The wets, who in desperation are advocating it, have not thought the problem through. As ordinarily
understood, it would lead to an intolerable situation. If nullification comes to pass, it should be as a process of government
permitting public opinion expressed through the legislature to
regulate and tax the liquor traffic as best suits its interests. The
plan we have outlined affords the people of Kentucky during the
Freund, "Police Power," p. 740.
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next two years (until the prohibition amendment can be removed
from the Kentucky Constitution) an opportunity to experiment
with reference to the regulation and taxation of the liquor traffic.
It is intolerable to think that our people should have their hands
tied for this two year period, simply because of the cumbersome
procedure of the amending process. If the legislature of Kentucky will take advantage of the plan outlined above, we have the
right to expect that a sane and efficient policy with reference to
the liquor traffic will be in force in this commonwealth before
the date of the repeal of the state constitutional prohibition
amendment. Let us hope that such a policy will become an
integral part of a sensible tax system for this commonwealth in
the future.

